On the susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink platform microcontrollers to non-invasive physical attacks

We investigate the susceptibility of the Texas Instruments SimpleLink platform microcontrollers to non-invasive physical attacks. We extracted the ROM bootloader of these microcontrollers and then analysed it using static analysis augmented with information obtained through emulation. We demonstrate a voltage fault injection attack targeting the ROM bootloader that allows to enable debug access on a previously locked microcontroller within seconds. Information provided by Texas Instruments reveals that one of our voltage fault injection attacks abuses functionality that is left over from the integrated circuit manufacturing process. The demonstrated physical attack allows an adversary to extract the firmware (i.e. intellectual property) and to bypass secure boot. Additionally, we mount side-channel attacks and differential fault analysis attacks on the hardware AES co-processor. To demonstrate the practical applicability of these attacks we extract the firmware from a Tesla Model 3 key fob. This paper describes a case study covering Texas Instruments SimpleLink microcontrollers. Similar attack techniques can be, and have been, applied to microcontrollers from other manufacturers. The goal of our work is to document our analysis methodology and to ensure that system designers are aware of these vulnerabilities. They will then be able to take these into account during the product design phase. All identified vulnerabilities were responsibly disclosed

Provable Secure Software Masking in the Real-World

We evaluate eight implementations of provable secure side-channel masking schemes that were published in top-tier academic venues such as Eurocrypt, Asiacrypt, CHES and SAC. Specifically, we evaluate the side-channel attack resistance of eight open-source and first-order side-channel protected AES-128 software implementations on the Cortex-M4 platform. Using a T-test based leakage assessment we demonstrate that all implementations produce first-order leakage with as little as 10,000 traces. Additionally, we demonstrate that all except for two Inner Product Masking based implementations are vulnerable to a straightforward correlation power analysis attack. We provide an assembly level analysis showing potential sources of leakage for two implementations. Some of the studied implementations were provided for benchmarking purposes. We demonstrate several flaws in the benchmarking procedures and question the usefulness of the reported performance numbers in the face of the implementations’ poor side-channel resistance. This work serves as a reminder that practical evaluations cannot be omitted in the context of side-channel analysis

Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication

Polynomial multiplication algorithms such as Toom-Cook and the Number Theoretic Transform are fundamental building blocks for lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. In this work, we present correlation power analysis-based side-channel analysis methodologies targeting every polynomial multiplication strategy for all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms in the final round of the NIST post-quantum standardization procedure. We perform practical experiments on real side-channel measurements demonstrating that our method allows to extract the secret key from all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms. Our analysis demonstrates that the used polynomial multiplication strategy can significantly impact the time complexity of the attack

Las observaciones de un gringo.

En octubre de 2015, los Primeros Juegos Mundiales indígenas se llevaron a cabo en una de las nuevas ciudades en la tierra: Palmas, Tocantins, Brasil. Me invitaron a venir a estos juegos Beatriz Ferreira y Marina Vinha, dos profesores de la Universidad Federal de Grande Dourados. Donde desarrolle un seminario sobre "Educación y Procesos Civilising '. En este articulo, presento mi impresión sobre este evento dedicado al registro, del la observaciones del gringo, sobre los inicio del evento, los signos de protesta y los intereses en conflicto, el ritual de hacer fuego, y un representante holandés, en la competencia y la celebración.In October 2015, the first ever World Indigenous Games were held in one of the newest cities on earth: Palmas, Tocatins, Brazil. I was invited to come along to these games with Beatriz Ferreira and Marina Vinha, two professors at the Universidade Federal de Grande Dourados, where I would first give a seminar on ‘Education and Civilising Processes’. In this paper a give my impression about this event focusing the registration, the token gringo, Start of the event, signs of protest and conflicting interests, the ritual of making fire , and a dutch representative , competition and celebration

My other car is your car: compromising the Tesla Model X keyless entry system

This paper documents a practical security evaluation of the Tesla Model X keyless entry system. In contrast to other works, the keyless entry system analysed in this paper employs secure symmetric-key and public-key cryptographic primitives implemented by a Common Criteria certified Secure Element. We document the internal workings of this system, covering the key fob, the body control module and the pairing protocol. Additionally, we detail our reverse engineering techniques and document several security issues. The identified issues in the key fob firmware update mechanism and the key fob pairing protocol allow us to bypass all of the cryptographic security measures put in place. To demonstrate the practical impact of our research we develop a fully remote Proof-of-Concept attack that allows to gain access to the vehicle’s interior in a matter of minutes and pair a modified key fob, allowing to drive off. Our attack is not a relay attack, as our new key fob allows us to start the car anytime anywhere. Finally, we provide an analysis of the update performed by Tesla to mitigate our findings. Our work highlights how the increased complexity and connectivity of vehicular systems can result in a larger and easier to exploit attack surface

Revisiting a Methodology for Efficient CNN Architectures in Profiling Attacks

This work provides a critical review of the paper by Zaid et al. titled “Methodology for Efficient CNN Architectures in Profiling attacks”, which was published in TCHES Volume 2020, Issue 1. This work studies the design of CNN networks to perform side-channel analysis of multiple implementations of the AES for embedded devices. Based on the authors’ code and public data sets, we were able to cross-check their results and perform a thorough analysis. We correct multiple misconceptions by carefully inspecting different elements of the model architectures proposed by Zaid et al. First, by providing a better understanding on the internal workings of these models, we can trivially reduce their number of parameters on average by 52%, while maintaining a similar performance. Second, we demonstrate that the convolutional filter’s size is not strictly related to the amount of misalignment in the traces. Third, we show that increasing the filter size and the number of convolutions actually improves the performance of a network. Our work demonstrates once again that reproducibility and review are important pillars of academic research. Therefore, we provide the reader with an online Python notebook which allows to reproduce some of our experiments1 and additional example code is made available on Github.

Fast, furious and insecure:passive keyless entry and start systems in modern supercars

The security of immobiliser and Remote Keyless Entry systems has been extensively studied over many years. Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems, which are currently deployed in luxury vehicles, have not received much attention besides relay attacks. In this work we fully reverse engineer a Passive Keyless Entry and Start system and perform a thorough analysis of its security.\u3cbr/\u3eOur research reveals several security weaknesses. Specifically, we document the use of an inadequate proprietary cipher using 40-bit keys, the lack of mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol, no firmware readout protection features enabled and the absence of security partitioning.\u3cbr/\u3eIn order to validate our findings, we implement a full proof of concept attack allowing us to clone a Tesla Model S key fob in a matter of seconds with low cost commercial off the shelf equipment. Our findings most likely apply to other manufacturers of luxury vehicles including McLaren, Karma and Triumph motorcycles as they all use the same system developed by Pektron

Fast, Furious and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars

The security of immobiliser and Remote Keyless Entry systems has been extensively studied over many years. Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems, which are currently deployed in luxury vehicles, have not received much attention besides relay attacks. In this work we fully reverse engineer a Passive Keyless Entry and Start system and perform a thorough analysis of its security. Our research reveals several security weaknesses. Specifically, we document the use of an inadequate proprietary cipher using 40-bit keys, the lack of mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol, no firmware readout protection features enabled and the absence of security partitioning. In order to validate our findings, we implement a full proof of concept attack allowing us to clone a Tesla Model S key fob in a matter of seconds with low cost commercial off the shelf equipment. Our findings most likely apply to other manufacturers of luxury vehicles including McLaren, Karma and Triumph motorcycles as they all use the same system developed by Pektron.status: Published onlin

Fast, Furious and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars

The security of immobiliser and Remote Keyless Entry systems has been extensively studied over many years. Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems, which are currently deployed in luxury vehicles, have not received much attention besides relay attacks. In this work we fully reverse engineer a Passive Keyless Entry and Start system and perform a thorough analysis of its security.Our research reveals several security weaknesses. Specifically, we document the use of an inadequate proprietary cipher using 40-bit keys, the lack of mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol, no firmware readout protection features enabled and the absence of security partitioning.In order to validate our findings, we implement a full proof of concept attack allowing us to clone a Tesla Model S key fob in a matter of seconds with low cost commercial off the shelf equipment. Our findings most likely apply to other manufacturers of luxury vehicles including McLaren, Karma and Triumph motorcycles as they all use the same system developed by Pektron

Fast, Furious and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars

The security of immobiliser and Remote Keyless Entry systems has been extensively studied over many years. Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems, which are currently deployed in luxury vehicles, have not received much attention besides relay attacks. In this work we fully reverse engineer a Passive Keyless Entry and Start system and perform a thorough analysis of its security.Our research reveals several security weaknesses. Specifically, we document the use of an inadequate proprietary cipher using 40-bit keys, the lack of mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol, no firmware readout protection features enabled and the absence of security partitioning.In order to validate our findings, we implement a full proof of concept attack allowing us to clone a Tesla Model S key fob in a matter of seconds with low cost commercial off the shelf equipment. Our findings most likely apply to other manufacturers of luxury vehicles including McLaren, Karma and Triumph motorcycles as they all use the same system developed by Pektron